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Abstract
This paper examines a dynamic incumbent-entrant framework with stochastic evolution of the (in-
verse) demand, in which both the optimal timing of the investments and the capacity choices are explicitly
considered. We ﬁnd that the incumbent invests earlier than the entrant and that entry deterrence is
achieved through timing rather than through overinvestment. This is because the incumbent invests
earlier and in a smaller amount compared to a scenario without potential entry. If, on the other hand,
the capacity size is exogenously given, the investment order changes and the entrant invests before the
incumbent does.
Keywords: Incumbent/Entrant, Capacity choice, Investment under Uncertainty, Oligopoly, Real-Option
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1 Introduction
Starting with the seminal paper by Spence (1977) the choice of production capacity as an instrument for
entry deterrence has been extensively studied in the literature. In a standard two-stage set-up, where the
incumbent chooses its capacity before the potential competitor decides about entry, entry deterrence is
achieved by the incumbent through overinvestment and leads to eternal absence of the competitor from the
market. After installing a suﬃciently large capacity by the incumbent, the potential entrant ﬁnds the market
not proﬁtable enough to undertake an investment. In a dynamic setting, where the demand evolves over
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time (with a positive trend), however, it cannot be expected that potential entrants are perpetually deterred
from the market. Hence, the question arises how the investment behavior of the incumbent is aﬀected by
the threat of entry in such a setting.
This paper considers a dynamic model where both an incumbent and an entrant have the option to acquire
once some (additional) production capacity. Both ﬁrms are free to choose the size of their installment, which
is assumed to be irreversible and is fully used in the market competition. As a ﬁrst result, we ﬁnd that under
general conditions the incumbent is most eager to undertake the investment ﬁrst. In this way the incumbent
accomplishes that it delays the investment of the entrant and it extends its monopoly period. The entrant
reacts by waiting with investment until demand has become suﬃciently large.
A second important result is that entry deterrence is not achieved via overinvestment, but via timing.
The threat of entry makes the incumbent invest sooner in order to precede investment of the entrant. Since
the incumbent’s investment increases the quantity on the market, the output price is reduced, which in turn
reduces the proﬁtability of entering this market, and thus delays entry. Furthermore, where large parts of
the literature ﬁnd that a monopolist sets a smaller capacity than a (potential) duopolist facing a threat of
entry, we ﬁnd the opposite result. Since the incumbent invests early, i.e. in a market with a still relatively
small demand, it pursues a small capacity expansion. In the absence of an entry threat the monopolist would
wait for a market with a higher demand and invest in a larger capacity. In other words, when deterring
entry, timing is of greater importance than overinvesting.
A crucial aspect of these results is that the size of the investment is ﬂexible. Considering a variant of
our model in which investment sizes are ﬁxed, the incumbent no longer has the possibility to undertake a
small investment in a small market in order to preempt the entrant. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that in such a
setting the investment order is reversed; the entrant undertakes an investment ﬁrst. The reason is that in
this situation, where the investment size and thus investment costs are equal, the entrant, which does not
suﬀer from cannibalization, has a larger incentive to invest. Being able to choose the investment size is thus
of key importance for making preemption optimal for the incumbent.
In a competitive set-up, the total net welfare as a result of investment is smaller than in a set-up where a
social welfare optimizer chooses the investment moment and investment size. Our study implies that policies,
aiming to closen the welfare gap between these two settings, include the intention to delay investment. The
introduction of, e.g., a license would contribute to such a policy. The incurred lump-sum cost induces ﬁrms
to delay investment. Resultingly, a larger capacity is installed which, in turn, contributes to an increase in
total welfare.
The results sketched above contribute to two main streams of literature, namely to the analysis of entry
deterrence strategies and to strategic real option theory. Based on early contributions by Spence (1977)
and Dixit (1980), a rich literature has explored the rationale behind entry deterrence in two-stage games
under a variety of assumptions about the mode of post-entry competition between ﬁrms. Whereas most of
this literature is based on deterministic models, Perrakis and Walskett (1983) show that key insights about
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optimality of deterrence respectively accommodation might change qualitatively if it is assumed that demand
is stochastic and uncertain for the ﬁrms at the time of investment. In more recent contributions to this stream
of literature Maskin (1999) and Swinney et al. (2011) highlight that high demand uncertainty makes entry
deterrence less attractive and fosters the use of accommodation strategies by incumbents. Robles (2011)
develops a two-period game where demand is deterministic and increasing between the two periods. He
characterizes conditions under which incumbents build capacities, which are partly idle in the ﬁrst period,
in order to deter other ﬁrms from the market. Our main contribution relative to these papers is not only
that we address the role of investment timing for potential entry deterrence, but also that we consider a
stochastically evolving market environment.
Early dynamic models of entry deterrence, like Spence (1979) or Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), focused
on the dynamics of (irreversible) capacity build-up in static market environments, if investment is bounded
from above. A key insight in this literature is that, in addition to equilibria which essentially correspond to
a Stackelberg equilibrium with the incumbent as leader, there exist Markov-perfect equilibria in which the
incumbent can strategically deter the follower from investing, thereby weakening competition. This is due
to the initial asymmetry and the dynamic build-up of capacity. More recently Boyer et al. (2004) studied
entry deterrence in a dynamic setting with price competition and a stochastically evolving willingness to
pay consumers. They assume that ﬁrms can invest repeatedly, where the size of each investment is ﬁxed,
and point out that in such a setting an important eﬀect of investment is the delay of the competitor’s
investment. It is shown that diﬀerent types of equilibria might arise in such a setting. In spite of the
usual logic associated with preemption under price competition, in some of these equilibria, ﬁrms acquire
positive rents. Concerning the timing of investment Boyer et al. (2004) show that in their setting (under
certain conditions) the incentives for preemption are smaller for the incumbent than for the challenger with
lower capacity. A similar setting with Cournot competition is studied in Boyer et al. (2012). It is shown
that competition induces too early ﬁrst investment relative to the social optimum and that the smaller ﬁrm
invests ﬁrst. The market environment considered in Boyer et al. (2004, 2012) is closely related to our setup.
However, the assumption of ﬁxed investment units crucially distinguishes these studies from our approach,
where both timing and investment size are chosen by the ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the endogeneity of investment
size is crucial and leads to qualitatively diﬀerent insights compared to settings with ﬁxed investment size.
Also, due to the consideration of Cournot competition, investment in Boyer et al. (2012) has considerably
less commitment power compared to the setup we consider. A main focus of Boyer et al. (2004, 2012), as
well as of recent studies by Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and Besanko et al. (2010) dealing with (partly)
reversible capacity investments in oligopolistic markets with stochastically evolving demand, is the long run
industry structure that emerges. Considering only one investment option for each ﬁrm, our paper does not
address this issue, but rather focuses on entry deterrence in the early phase of an industry with evolving
demand. Steg (2012) considers a dynamic oligopoly setting with stochastically evolving demand, in which
timing is endogeneous and investment size is fully ﬂexible. Analyzing Open-Loop Nash Equilibria of the
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game he shows that investment is always done by the smallest ﬁrm in the market. Our paper obtains that
in Markov-Perfect-Equilbira this conclusion of Steg (2012) no longer holds.
The main insight of our analysis that the incumbent invests prior to the entrant can be seen to follow the
logic to ”eat your own lunch before someone else does” (Deutschman, (1994)). This logic has been, among
others, explored in Nault and Vandenbosch (1996) in the framework of a model, where ﬁrms endogenously
choose the time to launch a new product generation. Apart from the fact that their paper does not explicitly
deal with capacity investment, the key diﬀerence to our approach is that the type of expansion as such is
ﬁxed and the size of the expansion cannot be chosen by the ﬁrms.
Our paper extends, in the second place, the literature on strategic real option models, where ﬁrms have
to decide about investing in a stochastic oligopolistic environment. Early work includes Smets (1991) and
Grenadier (1996). Like most of the papers in this ﬁeld, the investment decision only involves the timing of
investment. However, we study a problem where ﬁrms are free to choose their capacity levels as well. Within
a strategic real options framework, investment decisions involving both capacity choice and timing have ﬁrst
been considered by Huisman and Kort (2015). They study this problem for two symmetric entrants on a
new market. Our paper diﬀers from their analysis by considering an incumbent-entrant framework, in which
one of the players has an initial capacity.
Consistent with the existing literature on real options games we consider a setting where each ﬁrm has
a single investment option. This assumption corresponds to a scenario in which investment is lumpy and
allows us to derive explicit characterizations of both the timing and the size of investment in equilibrium.
Whereas our analysis is already innovative also from a technical perspective, fully characterizing the timing
and size of several lumpy investments in such a setting seems infeasible.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 explains the model and discusses its assumptions.
Section 3.1 looks at the case of exogenous ﬁrms roles, i.e. an individual ﬁrm knows beforehand whether it
will be the ﬁrst or second investor. Then the other ﬁrm can choose to invest at the same time or later. This
is followed by Section 3.2 studying the game when endogenizing investment roles, i.e. both ﬁrms are allowed
to become the ﬁrst investor. Section 3.3 then studies the case of a ﬁxed investment size. Section 4 focuses
on the size of the incumbent’s investment relative to that of the entrant and to an incumbent’s investment
without entry threat. Robustness checks are performed in Section 5 and Section 6 considers the problem
from the point of view of the social planner. The paper is concluded in Section 7. Three appendices provide
all proofs as well as numerical robustness checks and analyses of model extensions.
2 The Model
Consider an industry setting with two ﬁrms. One ﬁrm is actively producing and the other ﬁrm is a potential
entrant. The ﬁrst ﬁrm is the incumbent and is denoted as ﬁrm I. The potential entrant is denoted as ﬁrm E.
Both ﬁrms have a one-oﬀ investment opportunity. For ﬁrm I this means an expansion of its current capacity
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and for the entrant an investment means starting up production and entering this market. Both ﬁrms are
assumed to be rational, risk neutral and value maximizing. The inverse demand function on this market is
multiplicative1 and equals
p(t) = x(t)(1− ηQ(t)),
where p(t) is the output price, Q(t) equals the total aggregate quantity made available at time t and η is a
ﬁxed price sensitivity parameter. The exogenous shock process x(t) follows a geometric Brownian motion,
i.e.
dx(t) = αx(t)dt+ σxdz(t).
Here α and σ > 0 are the trend and volatility parameters and z(t) is a Wiener process.2 Although from
an economic perspective the consideration of an expanding market (i.e. α > 0) seems most relevant in our
framework, formally no assumption about the sign of α is required to carry out our analysis. Discounting
takes place under a ﬁxed positive rate r > α. The investment costs are linearly related to the investment
size, where the marginal cost parameter equals δ. The inverse demand function is chosen to be in line with
Huisman and Kort (2015), giving a linear relation between the production size and the output price. This
relation is also used by e.g. Pindyck (1988), He and Pindyck (1992), Aguerrevere (2003) and Wu (2007). As
of now, the denotation of time t shall be omitted to simplify notation. In this model ﬁrms are committed
to produce the amount their capacity allows. This assumption is widely used in the literature on capacity
constrained oligopolies (e.g. Deneckere et al. (1997), Chod and Rudi (2005), Anand and Girotra (2007),
Goyal and Netessine (2007) and Huisman and Kort (2015)). For example, Goyal and Netessine (2007) argue
that ﬁrms may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to produce below capacity due to ﬁxed costs associated with, for example,
labor, commitments to suppliers, and production ramp-up.
The investment comprises two decisions: timing and capacity size. The game is solved backwards, ﬁrst
determining the reaction curve of the ﬁrm investing last and then determining the optimal strategy of the
ﬁrm that invests ﬁrst. In this way all subgame perfect equilibria are determined.3
Initial capacity size
The incumbent is currently active on the market with initial capacity q1I . In principle, the parameter q1I
can take any value. However, in parts of the following analysis we will consider scenarios where the size of
initial capital is determined according to the optimal investment level of the incumbent under the assumption
1In Section 5.2 the robustness of our results will be tested by analyzing a diﬀerent demand function.
2Throughout the paper we will refer to the current value of the process x(t) as X.
3Since a rigorous formulation of the Markovian strategy proﬁles corresponding to the equilibria characterized in this paper
induces a heavy notational and technical load without providing additional economic insights, we refrain from presenting them
here. Riedel and Steg (2014) provide an approach for a rigorous foundation of preemption-type equilibria in stochastic timing
games based on the original ideas of extended mixed strategies by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). This approach could be applied
to formulate strategy proﬁles underlying our equilibria.
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that no future investment will be made by any ﬁrm.4 We refer to such an initial capacity as the myopic
investment level qmyop1I . Straightforward calculations (see Huisman and Kort (2015)) give
qmyop1I =
1
η(β + 1)
.
In any case, we analyze equilibria with q1I ≤ qmyop1I , since it is unreasonable to assume any larger initial
capacity.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we characterize the investment behavior in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game described above. Employing the standard terminology in timing games (see, e.g., Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985)), the ﬁrst investor is called the leader and the second investor is called the follower. As a
ﬁrst step in our analysis, the next section derives optimal size and timing of investments of the two ﬁrms if
investment roles are given, i.e. it is ex-ante determined which of the two ﬁrms invests ﬁrst. We ﬁrst derive
the optimal decisions of the follower. Next, the leader’s strategies are studied. Section 3.2 considers the case
of endogenous ﬁrm roles, where both ﬁrms are allowed to invest ﬁrst. In this part, the results about optimal
behavior and the corresponding value functions of the two ﬁrms under ﬁxed investment roles are employed
to determine which of the ﬁrms will be the investment leader. Finally, in the last part of this section we
contrast the obtained results with equilibrium behavior in a setting where the size of investment is ﬁxed.
3.1 Exogenous ﬁrm roles
Assuming that the sequence of investments is ﬁxed, we denote the following ﬁrm as ﬁrm F and similarly, the
leading ﬁrm as ﬁrm L. The follower’s and leader’s initial capacities are denoted by q1F and q1L respectively.
Capacity expansion is done by installing additional quantities q2F and q2L. We distinguish between two
cases. First, the incumbent takes the role of the leader and the entrant takes the role of the follower, with
q1L = q1I , q1F = 0, q2L = q2I and q2F = qE . Second, the entrant undertakes an investment before the
incumbent expands and we have q1L = 0, q1F = q1I , q2L = qE and q2F = q2I . In this section, both cases
are analyzed simultaneously.
Follower’s decision
Consider the situation where one ﬁrm, the leader, has already invested. Suppose the market has grown
suﬃciently large for the follower to undertake an investment, i.e. the current value of the process x is
4Implicitly we thereby assume that the monopoly investment trigger has been reached in the past inducing the positive
investment by the ﬁrm.
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suﬃciently large. One then obtains the following value function reﬂecting the follower’s expected payoﬀ,
VF (X, q1L, q1F , q2L, q2F ) = E
[ ∞∫
t=0
(q1F + q2F )p(t)e
−rtdt− δq2F
∣∣∣ x(0) = X
]
=
X
r − α (q1F + q2F )(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F ))− δq2F .
The follower’s value function consists of two terms. The expected discounted cash inﬂow stream resulting
from selling goods on the market is reﬂected by the ﬁrst term. The involved costs, when making the
investment, are captured by the second term. The optimal size of the investment, qopt2F , is found by optimizing
the value function.
To determine the optimal moment of investment we derive the investment threshold X∗F (q1L, q1F , q2L).
Investment takes place at the moment the stochastic process x reaches this level for the ﬁrst time (see, e.g.,
Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Thereto, one ﬁrst needs the value function of the follower before it invests.
Standard calculations presented in the appendix show that
VF (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) =
δ
β − 1
(
X
X∗F
)β
qopt2F (X
∗
F , q1L, q1F , q2L) +
X
r − αq1F (1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L)),
where
β =
1
2
− α
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− α
σ2
)2
+
2r
σ2
. (1)
Due to the assumption that r > α we have β > 1. The value function FF consists of two terms. The second
term represents the current proﬁt stream. In case the incumbent is follower, this stream is positive with
q1F = q1I . When the entrant is the follower one has q1F = 0 leading to zero current proﬁts. The ﬁrst term
is the current value of the option to invest.
The following proposition characterizes the follower’s optimal investment strategy.
Proposition 1 For small current values X of the stochastic demand process the follower waits until the
process x(t) reaches the investment trigger X∗F to install q
∗
2F and for X ≥ X∗F the ﬁrm invests immediately.
As a result, the follower’s value function is given by
VF (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
δ
β−1
(
X
X∗F
)β
q∗2F +
X
r−αq1F (1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L)) if X < X∗F ,
X
r−α (q1F + q
opt
2F )(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + qopt2F ))− δq2F if X ≥ X∗F ,
(2)
where the optimal capacity level for the follower qopt2F and the investment trigger X
∗
F are deﬁned by
qopt2F (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) =
1
2η
(
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L)− δ(r − α)
X
)
, (3)
X∗F (q1L, q1F , q2L) =
β + 1
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L) . (4)
The follower’s capacity in case the follower invests at the investment trigger equals
q∗2F = q
opt
2F (X
∗
F , q1L, q1F , q2L) =
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L)
η(β + 1)
. (5)
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Leader’s decision
As can be inferred from equation (4), there is a positive relation between the leader’s investment quantity
q2L and the follower’s investment threshold. The leader can thus delay the follower’s investment by setting
q2L in such a way that the follower’s trigger X
∗
F exceeds the current value of x. To that extend, there exists
a qˆ2L such that for q2L > qˆ2L it holds that X < X
∗
F . From equation (4) one obtains
qˆ2L(X, q1L, q1F ) =
1
η
[
1− η(q1L + 2q1F )− δ(β + 1)(r − α)
(β − 1)X
]
.
For q2L > qˆ2L the follower invests later, which means that by choosing a suﬃciently high investment q2L
the leader can delay the investment of the follower. In case the incumbent is the leader, we have that the
incumbent is a monopolist as long as X < X∗F , and as soon as x hits X
∗
F a duopoly arises, since at that
point the entrant undertakes an investment. Hence, this strategy of the incumbent corresponds to entry
deterrence. If the leader chooses q2L ≤ qˆ2L then the follower’s investment occurs immediately and the
follower chooses a capacity given by (5). In case the incumbent is the leader such behavior corresponds to
an entry accommodation strategy. Without specifying whether the leader is the incumbent or the entrant
we refer to the leader’s choice of q2L > qˆ2L as delaying the follower and to the opposite case of q2L ≤ qˆ2L as
inducing immediate follower investment. In what follows, the implication of both strategies are examined
and then the leader’s payoﬀs under these strategies are compared.
Delaying the follower
Straightforward calculations yield that the value function of the leader under this strategy, denoted by
V detL (X, q1L, q1F , q2L), is given by
5
V detL = E
[∫ tF
t=0
(q1L + q2L)x(t)(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L))e−rtdt
+
∫ ∞
t=tF
(q1L + q2L)x(t)(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q∗2F ))e−rtdt
∣∣∣x(0) = X
]
− δq2L
=
X
r − α (q1L + q2L)(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L)− ηq
∗
2F (q1L + q2L)
X∗F
r − α
(
X
X∗F
)β
− δq2L
=
X
r − α (q1L + q2L)(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L))−
δ
β − 1(q1L + q2L)
(
X
X∗F
)β
− δq2L.
This value function consists of three parts. The ﬁrst integral denotes the expected discounted revenue
stream obtained by the leader before the follower has invested. Then, at the (stochastic) time tF ≥ 0 the
follower decides to make an investment, where, tF = inf{t ≥ 0 | x(t) ≥ X∗F }, and the second integral reﬂects
the leader’s expected discounted revenue stream from that moment on. The third term is the investment
5Since, as we will show later, in equilibrium the incumbent becomes the leader, we prefer to comply the denotation associated
with this strategy with the deterrence strategy and we will hence use det to signify the strategy where the leader delays the
follower’s investment. In slight abuse of notation we will, in what follows, express the leader’s value function sometimes as an
explicit function of the second investment of the leader, q2L. Whenever no such argument is given the value function under the
optimal choice of q2L is considered.
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outlay. The expression in the last line can then by interpreted as the expected revenue stream in case the
follower will never invest minus the (negative) adjustment of the cash ﬂow stream from the moment the
second ﬁrm makes an investment, followed by the investment costs. The second term includes the stochastic
discount factor E [e−rtF ] =
(
X
X∗F
)β
, where again tF is the time of investment of the follower.
Recalling that qˆ2L(X, q1L, q1F ) denotes the minimal investment size of the leader to make the follower
invest later, the optimal investment size under this strategy is given by
qdetL (X, q1L, q1F ) = argmax{V detL (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) | q2L ≥ max{0, qˆ2L}}. (6)
If X is so small that qdetL (X, q1L, q1F ) = 0, no investment is made at this point. The corresponding lower
bound for X, under which investment is not considered feasible, is given by
Xdet1 = max{X | qdetL (X, q1L, q1F ) = 0}.
Furthermore, considering the lower bound qˆ2L needed to make the follower invest later, one can infer that
for some values of X the optimum does not lie in the interior of the feasible region, i.e. for some X one
has qdetL = qˆ2L, leading to immediate investment by the follower. Thus, for these scenarios delaying cannot
be optimal for the leader. The following proposition, which characterizes the optimal leader strategy while
delaying the follower shows that there exists an upper bound Xdet2 such that q
det
L > qˆ2L if and only if
X < Xdet2 . For X ≥ Xdet2 it would be too costly for the leader to delay the follower’s investment, since
demand is so large that the incentive for the follower to invest at the same time as the leader is very high.
Proposition 2 There exist unique values 0 < Xdet1 (q1L, q1F ) < X
det
2 (q1L, q1F ) such that q
det
L (X, q1L, q1F ) >
max{0, qˆ2L(X, q1L, q1F )} if and only if X ∈ (Xdet1 , Xdet2 ). Furthermore, for suﬃciently small q1L there exists
a pair (qdet∗L , X
det
L ) with X
det
L ∈ (Xdet1 , Xdet2 ) satisfying qdet∗L = qdetL (XdetL , q1L, q1F ) and
XdetL =
β
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− 2ηq1L − ηq1F − ηqdet∗L
, (7)
such that under the delaying follower investment strategy,
(i) for X ≥ XdetL the leader immediately invests qdetL (X, q1L, q1F ) and the value function of the leader is
given by
V detL (X, q1L, q1F ) =
X
r − α (q1L+q
det
L )(1−η(q1L+q1F +qdetL ))−
δ
β − 1(q1L+q
det
L )
(
X
X∗F
)β
−δqdetL ; (8)
(ii) for X < XdetL the leader invests q
det∗
L at the moment x reaches the investment threshold value X
det
L .
The value function before investment is given by
F detL (X, q1L, q1F ) =
X
r − αq1L(1− η(q1L + q1F )) +
(
X
XdetL
)β δqdet∗L
β − 1 − (q1L + q
det∗
L )
(
X
X∗F
)β δ
β − 1 . (9)
The intuition for the observation, that a thresholdXdetL , at which the leader invests, exists only if the initial
capacity size of the leader is suﬃciently small, is straightforward. In case the initial capacity of the leader is
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large, it is optimal for the leader to abstain from any further investment, since this also blocks any further
investment of the follower6 and allows the leader to sell the quantity corresponding to its current capacity at
a larger price. Although the proof of Proposition 2 assumes that q1L is small, numerical analysis indicates
that the range of values of q1L, for which the threshold X
det
L exists and the leader therefore eventually invests,
is typically of substantial size. Clearly, the assumption of ﬁxed investment roles is crucial for the observation
that the leader can block the follower by not investing. With endogenous investment roles delaying own
investment does not block investments of the competitor and hence preemption is a crucial issue. This is
analyzed in Section 3.2.
Inducing immediate follower investment
If the leader chooses a capacity below qˆ2L(X, q1L, q1F ), it induces immediate investment by the follower
but nevertheless acts as Stackelberg capacity leader. The value function contains two terms, the expected
discounted revenue stream resulting from investment and the investment cost,7
V accL (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) = E
[∫ ∞
t=0
(q1L + q2L)x(t)(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + qopt2F ))e−rtdt
∣∣∣x(0) = X
]
− δq2L
=
X
r − α (q1L + q2L)(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q
opt
2F ))− δq2L.
The ﬁrm chooses its capacity qaccL (X, q1L, q1F ) in such a way that it optimizes V
acc
L (X, q1L, q1F , q2L),
given the restriction qaccL ≤ qˆ2L. The latter makes that this strategy is restricted to a certain region of
x. When the shock process attains a relatively large value, the optimal quantity qaccL meets the restriction
qaccL ≤ qˆ2L. However, for small values of x, the market is too small for two ﬁrms to invest at the same
time and one observes that qaccL > qˆ2L. Therefore, there exists a X
acc
0 (q1L, q1F ) such that for X < X
acc
0
simultaneous investment will not occur, since the optimal investment of the leader is suﬃciently large to
delay the follower’s investment.8 Furthermore, similarly to when delaying the follower, making the follower
investment immediately requires that the optimal investment level qaccL is strictly positive. We obtain from
the ﬁrst order condition of maximizing V accL the investment level
qaccL (X, q1L) =
1
2η
[
1− 2ηq1L − δ(r − α)
X
]
. (10)
The optimal investment size of the leader does not depend on the initial capacity of the follower. In fact it
corresponds to the Stackelberg leader capacity level, where it turns out that the Stackelberg leader quantity
equals the quantity of the monopolist. The following proposition presents the inducing immediate follower
investment strategy.
Proposition 3 The inducing immediate follower investment strategy is feasible for X > Xacc1 , where
Xacc1 = max
{
β + 3
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− 4ηq1F ,
δ(r − α)
1− 2ηq1L
}
. (11)
6Note that we are in the exogenous ﬁrm roles case where the follower is only allowed to invest after the leader has chosen to
do so.
7The superscript acc refers to the accommodation strategy that arises here, when the investment leader is the incumbent.
8Note that investing qaccL = qˆ2L is never optimal: V
acc
L (qˆ2L) = V
det
L (qˆ2L) < V
det
L (q
det
L ).
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Furthermore, for suﬃciently small q1L there exists a pair (q
acc∗
L , X
acc
L ) with X
acc
L >
δ(r−α)
1−2ηq1L satisfying
qacc∗L = q
acc
L (X
acc
L , q1L) and
XaccL =
δ(r − α)β
β − 1
qacc∗L − q1L
(qacc∗L − q1L)(1− ηq1L)− ηqacc∗L (qacc∗L + q1L)
, (12)
such that under the inducing immediate follower investment strategy
(i) for X ≥ XaccL the leader immediately invests qaccL (X, q1L, q1F ) and the value function of the leader is
given by
V accL (X, q1L, q1F ) =
X
r − α
1
2 (q1L + q
acc
L )(1− η(q1L + qaccL ))− 12δ(qaccL − q1L); (13)
(ii) for X < XaccL the leader invests q
acc∗
L at the moment x reaches the investment threshold value X
acc
L .
The value function before investment is given by
F accL (X, q1L, q1F ) =
X
r − αq1L(1− η(q1L + q1F )) +
(
X
XaccL
)β δqacc∗L
β − 1 . (14)
Optimal leader strategy
The characterization of the leader’s optimal behavior under the delaying follower investment respectively
inducing immediate follower investment strategy, allows us to derive the optimal strategy of the leader.
Proposition 4 There is an interval of positive length [Xacc1 , X
det
2 ] on which both the delaying follower in-
vestment strategy and the inducing immediate follower investment strategy are feasible for the leader. For
X < Xacc1 the leader delays the follower’s investment and for X > X
det
2 the ﬁrms invest simultaneously.
Moreover, there exists an Xˆ ∈ (Xacc1 , Xdet2 ) such that the delaying follower investment strategy is always
optimal for X < Xˆ.
Extensive numerical exploration shows that the threshold Xˆ is unique and therefore separates the parts
of the state-space where the delaying follower investment strategy respectively inducing immediate follower
investment strategy is optimal, i.e. there exists a Xˆ ∈ (Xacc1 , Xdet2 ) such that for X < Xˆ it is optimal for
the leader to delay the follower’s investment, whereas inducing immediate investment is optimal for X ≥ Xˆ.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that Xˆ > max{XdetL , XaccL }, which implies that the leader optimally waits in the region
0 ≤ X < XdetL and invests qdetL (X, q1L, q1F ) in the region XdetL ≤ X < Xˆ, thereby delaying investment by the
follower. For X ≥ Xˆ it is optimal for the leader to immediately invest qaccL (X, q1L, q1F ), which triggers an
immediate investment of the follower. Figure 1 illustrates these ﬁndings.9 The value function of the leader
is therefore given by
VL(X, q1L, q1F ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
F detL (X, q1L, q1F ) if X ∈ (0, XdetL ),
V detL (X, q1L, q1F ) if X ∈ [XdetL , Xˆ),
V accL (X, q1L, q1F ) if X ∈ [Xˆ,∞).
(15)
9All examples in this paper use the following parametrization: α = 0.02, r = 0.1, σ = 0.1, η = 0.1, δ = 1000, q1I =
1
η(β+1)
.
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Figure 1: The leader’s value functions while delaying the follower (solid) and while inducing immediate
follower investment (dashed).
Assuming x(0) to be suﬃciently small, our analysis implies that for exogenous ﬁrm roles the leader waits
until x(t) reaches XdetL and invests. Then the follower waits until x(t) reaches X
∗
F , at which point in time
the follower invests.
3.2 Endogenous ﬁrm roles
Based on the results of the previous section we can now examine the equilibrium behavior if the investment
order is not ﬁxed ex-ante and both ﬁrms are allowed to invest ﬁrst. To characterize the ﬁrms’ optimal
behavior we need to consider the value functions of a ﬁrm if it acts as leader respectively follower. Figure 2a
shows the two value functions for a ﬁrm depending on the current value X of the state variable. The solid
curve corresponds to the outcome if the considered ﬁrm takes the leader role, where the payoﬀ of immediate
investment is depicted. If the ﬁrm takes the position of the follower, one arrives at the dashed curve,
corresponding to (2). For small values of X investment is not proﬁtable. Then no ﬁrm wants to invest
ﬁrst, which is why the follower curve lies above the leader curve. For larger values, though, each ﬁrm wants
to be the ﬁrst investor. The curves are qualitatively similar for the incumbent and the entrant ﬁrm. This
means that when X is large enough both ﬁrms prefer to become the leader. To prevent that the competitor
undertakes an investment ﬁrst, thereby making the ﬁrm end up with the follower value instead of the higher
leader value, it is best to preempt the other ﬁrm by making an investment just a bit earlier. As this strategy
is optimal to both ﬁrms, investment is made as early as possible, provided the leader’s payoﬀ exceeds the
follower’s payoﬀ. Hence, assuming that the initial value of the process x(t) is smaller than XP , as given in
Figure 2a, the ﬁrst moment for a ﬁrm to invest, that is, when investment as a leader becomes worth-while,
is at the lowest value of X for which the leader curve no longer yields a smaller value than the follower
curve. This point is called the preemption point XP . Formally, the preemption points of the incumbent and
12
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(a) Value functions that correspond to becoming leader
(solid) and follower (dashed). The follower is delayed for
X < Xˆ and invests immediately for X ≥ Xˆ.
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(b) Preemption points XPI (solid) and XPE (dashed) with
free capacity choice for diﬀerent values of q1I .
Figure 2: Preemption points.
entrant are deﬁned in the following way,
XPI = min{X > 0 | V detL (X, q1I , 0) = VF (X, 0, q1I , qdetL (X, 0, q1I))},
XPE = min{X > 0 | V detL (X, 0, q1I) = VF (X, q1I , 0, qdetL (X, q1I , 0))}.
Since q1I > 0, the two ﬁrms are asymmetric and therefore their preemption points do not coincide. Clearly,
for a ﬁrm, of which its preemption point is below that of the competitor, it can never be an equilibrium
strategy to choose an investment trigger above the competitor’s preemption point. If the ﬁrm would choose
such a large trigger the opponent’s best response would imply that the ﬁrm ends up as follower, and therefore
with a smaller value compared to what it can gain as leader (see Figure 2a). If, furthermore, the optimal
trigger XdetL under the delaying follower investment strategy of that ﬁrm is larger than the opponent’s
preemption point, then the ﬁrm has no incentives to invest before the opponent’s preemption point is
reached. In such a situation it constitutes equilibrium behavior for the ﬁrm with the lower preemption point
to set its investment trigger to the opponent’s preemption point and to invest an amount which delays the
opponent’s investment. Following its optimal strategy the opponent chooses the follower’s investment trigger
and invests once this trigger is reached. Such an equilibrium is referred to as a preemption equilibrium and
the following proposition shows that at least for appropriate initial capacity of the incumbent no other types
of subgame-perfect equilibria exist in the considered game.
Proposition 5 Assume that the initial capacity of the incumbent is suﬃciently close to qmyop1I . Then,
preemptive investment constitutes a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
In order to clarify which ﬁrm acts as leader in the preemption equilibrium, we depict in Figure 2b the
preemption points of the incumbent and the entrant for values of q1I in the entire relevant range [0, q
myop
1I ].
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It can be clearly seen that the preemption point of the incumbent is below that of the entrant. Furthermore,
it is easy to check that the leader’s investment trigger under the delaying follower investment strategy, if it is
ﬁnite, is generically much larger than the entrant’s preemption point (see also Lemma 1 in Appendix A).10
Together, these two observations establish that the incumbent acts as leader in the preemption equilibrium.
Hence, for a suﬃciently small value of x(0) it is optimal for the incumbent to wait initially and to invest the
amount qdetL just as the process x reaches the preemption point of the entrant. The investment is chosen in
a way to delay the investment of the entrant and therefore it is an instrument of entry deterrence. Using
this strategy the incumbent can delay the entry of its opponent till the trigger X∗F (q1I , 0, q2I) is reached by
x(t).
Example 1 Considering, as an illustrative example, the case q1I = q
myop
1I , which under our default parametriza-
tion yields q1I = 2.37, we obtain XPI = 134 and XPE = 167. This means that for X < 134 both ﬁrms prefer
to wait, for 134 ≤ X < 167 the incumbent prefers to be leader and the entrant prefers to wait and for X ≥ 167
both want to invest. The investment trigger XdetLI is not ﬁnite in this situation since the incumbent would
not undertake an investment in the case of exogenous ﬁrm roles (see Lemma 1 in the Appendix). Hence,
the only reason the incumbent invests at X = XPE = 167 is strategic. Due to its investment the entrant’s
investment trigger is set to X∗F = 208 and till x(t) reaches this level the incumbent stays a monopolist.
To understand this result one must realize that any investment reduces the output price, since this price
is negatively related with the total market output. Investment by the entrant thus reduces the incumbent’s
value. It is then better for the incumbent to cannibalize than let the entrant reduce the price. To do so, the
incumbent installs a small capacity level: small in order not to make the cannibalization eﬀect too large,
but large enough to delay investment of the entrant. To conclude, the incumbent installs a small additional
capacity with the aim to protect its demand, and to prolong the period where it can proﬁt from its monopoly
position. The entrant will invest later when demand is higher so it can set a larger quantity on the market.
This leads to the result that the incumbent invests ﬁrst and expands to delay a large investment by the
entrant. The latter waits until the state variable hits the follower’s investment threshold.
3.3 Fixed Capacity
In order to highlight the importance of the endogenous choice of investment size for our main ﬁnding that the
incumbent invests prior to the entrant, in this section, we consider a scenario where the size of investment
is ﬁxed. Apart from improving our understanding of the role of endogenous investment size, the main
motivation for considering a scenario with ﬁxed investment is that for industries where expansion has to
be typically carried out in ﬁxed units, for example the establishment of an additional laboratory in the
pharmaceutical industry, the assumption of a ﬁxed investment size seems more appropriate than that of
10As elaborated in Section 5.1 these two inequalities do not depend on the particular parametrization of the model chosen
here but stay intact over a large range of relevant parameter settings.
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Figure 3: Preemption triggers XPI (solid) and XPE (dashed) with ﬁxed capacity for diﬀerent values of q1I
with K = 2.5.
complete ﬂexibility in the size of investment. This section shows that whether investment size is exogenous
or endogenous is indeed crucial for the emerging investment order.
Consider the model presented above, but assume investment size is ﬁxed such that q2I = qE = K. The
incumbent’s value functions as leader (under the deterrence strategy) and follower are then similar to what
was found previously,
V detLI (X, q1I , 0,K) =
X
r − α (q1I +K)(1− η(q1I +K))−
X∗FE
r − αηK(q1I +K)
(
X
X∗FE
)β
− δK,
VFI(X, q1I , 0,K) =
X
r − α (q1I +K)(1− η(q1I + 2K))− δK,
FFI(X, q1I , 0,K) = A
det
FIX
β +
X
r − αq1I(1− η(q1I +K)),
where X∗FE =
β
β−1
δ(r−α)
1−η(q1I+2K) and X
∗
FI(q1I , 0,K) =
β
β−1
δ(r−α)
1−2η(q1I+K) are the investment triggers of the
entrant and the incumbent as follower, and AdetFI (q1I , 0,K) =
δK
β−1 (X
∗
FI)
−β
. In a similar way one can
determine the value functions of the entrant.
Next, one can calculate the preemption points. In Section 3.2 it was shown that under endogenous choice
of the investment size the incumbent invests ﬁrst, where it expands by an adequate amount such that the
entrant’s investment is temporarily hold oﬀ. Figure 3 shows the preemption points for the model presented
in this section, i.e. where investment size is ﬁxed. The relative position of the curves has changed compared
to Figure 2b, which depicts the case with endogenous investment size: the entrant’s curve now lies below
the incumbent’s curve, signifying that in this model the entrant precedes the incumbent in undertaking an
investment. Thus, the entrant takes the leader role and the incumbent becomes follower.
If ﬁrms are free to choose the size of their installment, the incumbent has the largest incentive to invest
ﬁrst, for it can undertake a small investment in order to delay a large investment by the entrant. When ﬁxing
capacity for both ﬁrms at an equal level, this no longer applies: since capacity size is ﬁxed, the incumbent
cannot make a small investment to delay a large investment by the follower. Then the incentive to invest is
higher for the entrant, since it does not suﬀer from cannibalization. As a result, the incumbent is more eager
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Figure 4: Preemption triggers XPI (solid) and XPE (dashed) with ﬁxed capacity for diﬀerent values of K
with q1I = q
myop
1I .
to delay its own investment and the entrant is the investment leader. Figure 4 shows that the observation
that the entrant invests ﬁrst when capacity size is ﬁxed, is robust with respect to changes in the size of
investment K.
4 Overinvestment and Market Leadership
4.1 Overinvestment
In the literature on entry deterrence incumbents mainly deter entrants by means of overinvestment (e.g.,
Spence (1979) and Dixit (1980)). That is, by building large capacities on the market, it becomes unproﬁtable
for other ﬁrms to enter this market. Static entry deterrence models suggest that, apart from cases where
markets are blocked (e.g. due to high entry costs), the quantity put on the market under an entry threat
exceeds the amount that would be optimal for the ﬁrm in case that there is no potential entrant. This section
investigates whether this notion of overinvestment also applies in the dynamic stochastic market framework
presented in Section 3.
Overinvestment is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the quantity an incumbent sets on the market when
there exists a threat of entry and the quantity it would set when this threat would not be present. In other
words, the incumbent’s expansion in the duopoly setting as presented in the previous section is compared
to the incumbent’s expansion in case it is a monopolist forever. To this end, the monopolist’s model is
presented and analyzed.
The value function of the monopolist, at the moment of investment, is given by
VM (X, q1) = E
[∫ ∞
0
(q1 + q2)X(t)(1− η(q1 + q2))e−rtdt
∣∣∣ x(0) = X
]
− δq2
=
X
r − α (q1 + q2)(1− η(q1 + q2))− δq2,
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With Entry Threat Without Entry Threat
Trigger Expansion Trigger Expansion
q1I XPE q
det∗
L X
mon
L q
mon∗
2
0 123 1.59 152 2.37
0.5 129 1.26 169 2.13
1 136 0.97 190 1.90
1.5 145 0.71 217 1.66
2 157 0.48 254 1.42
2.5 171 0.29 304 1.19
Table 1: Expansions made by the incumbent with and without entry threat for diﬀerent values of q1I .
in which q1 is the initial capacity and q2 corresponds to the capacity acquired by investment. Maximizing
the monopolist’s value function leads to the optimal capacity expansion size,
qmon2 (X, q1) = max
{
1
2η
(
1− 2ηq1 − δ(r − α)
X
)
, 0
}
.
Hence, one obtains,
VM (X, q1) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
X
r−αq1(1− ηq1) +
(
X
X∗M
)β
δ
β−1q
mon∗
2 if X < X
∗
M ,
(X(1−2ηq1)−δ(r−α))2
4η(r−α)X +
Xq1(1−ηq1)
r−α if X ≥ X∗M ,
where β is deﬁned as in (1). The optimal moment of expansion is deﬁned as the value of x for which the
option to wait no longer yields a larger value than immediate investment. Standard analysis shows that for
the expansion the optimal threshold and size equal
X∗M =
β + 1
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− 2ηq1 ,
qmon∗2 =
1− 2ηq1
η(β + 1)
.
To measure overinvestment, the diﬀerence between qdet∗L and q
mon∗
2 needs to be considered. Table 1
illustrates this diﬀerence for our standard parameter setting. In this table, the optimal investment moment
and the optimal investment size are given for diﬀerent values of the initial investment size, both with (ﬁrst
pair of columns) and without (second pair of columns) threat of an entrant. Overinvestment would occur
if qdet∗L > q
mon∗
2 . However, the table illustrates the opposite. To explain this, one must realize that the
investment threshold values of the monopolist are higher than the ones of the incumbent in a duopoly
setting. The incumbent, by all force, prefers to keep its monopoly position as long as possible and thereto
it delays investment of the entrant by preempting the entrant’s preferred investment moment. This leads
to an investment in a market that is still small at the moment of investment. For this reason the capacity
investment of the ﬁrm is small as well. The monopolist, however, has the ﬂexibility to wait for a price that
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Incumbent (Leader) Entrant (Follower)
q1I Trigger Total Capac. Trigger Capacity
0 123 1.59 180 1.99
0.5 129 1.76 185 1.95
1 136 1.97 190 1.90
1.5 145 2.21 195 1.85
2 157 2.48 202 1.78
2.5 171 2.79 211 1.71
Table 2: Total capacities of the incumbent and the entrant for diﬀerent values of q1I .
has grown to a considerable level before investing. We conclude that, under consideration of endogenous
timing as well as endogenous investment size, entry deterrence is not so much about the size but more about
the timing of the investment.
4.2 Market leadership
When studying industry evolution and entry deterrence, a crucial issue is the question under which circum-
stances early incumbents in an industry are able to maintain their market leadership as the market grows.
This section illustrates that in our considered setting the incumbent does not necessarily maintain its market
leader position after the entrant’s investment. Intuitively, a larger initial capacity level has two contradictory
eﬀects on the expansions. First, a larger initial capacity, makes the expansion size decrease, for the cannibal-
ization eﬀect is larger for the ﬁrm already owning a larger capital stock. Second, since investment is delayed,
a larger market is observed at the moment of investment, which gives an incentive to increase investment
size. The former eﬀect, however, is dominant and one observes that a larger initial capacity makes the size
of the expansion decrease, see e.g. Table 1. The incumbent’s total capacity, however, increases when the
initial market’s output size is larger.
Table 2 shows the ﬁnal capacity level of the incumbent ﬁrm (third column) and the entrant (ﬁfth column).
As one can observe, for a small initial capacity level the entrant becomes the market leader. However, when
the incumbent starts with a suﬃciently large capacity level, it keeps its position as market leader after the
second ﬁrm’s entry. Market leadership thus depends on the initial market size.
In a framework with two potential entrants, i.e. no ﬁrm prossesses an initial capacity, Huisman and Kort
(2015) point out that market leadership is dependent on uncertainty. In particular, they show that for
large demand uncertainty the ﬁrst investor becomes market leader, while the second investor will invest
in a larger capacity when the demand uncertainty is low. Combining this with our ﬁndings, implies that
market leadership depends on both initial capacity and demand uncertainty. Denote by qML1I the value of
the initial capacity for which the total incumbent’s capacity equals the amount set by the entrant. As
18
0.4
Σ0
0.62
q1I
ML
Incumbent
Entrant
Figure 5: Market leader regions for diﬀerent σ.
illustrated in Figure 5, qML1I decreases when uncertainty increases. Larger uncertainty makes the incumbent
delay investment, which results in a larger expansion investment, making it market leader for smaller values
of q1I relative to the case of smaller uncertainty. In this ﬁgure one can clearly observe for which combinations
of the initial capacity level and the uncertainty level the incumbent is market leader and in which region the
entrant becomes market leader. In a very uncertain economic environment, the incumbent always becomes
market leader. However, for small uncertainty levels a certain range q1I ∈ [0, qML1I ) exists for which the
entrant ends up with the largest market share.
5 Robustness
In this section two types of robustness checks are performed in order to verify the validity of our results.
First, the eﬀects of changes of parameter values is studied. It is shown that the investment order remains
the same for a large range of parameter values. Second, we impose a diﬀerent demand structure and show
that also this does not change our qualitative conclusions.
5.1 Parameter variations
In order to inspect the eﬀect of changes in parameter values on the investment order, the diﬀerence between
the two preemption points as well as the diﬀerence between the incumbent’s investment threshold and the
entrant’s preemption trigger is shown for a variation of all parameters in Appendix B. This makes clear
that the insight that the incumbent invests ﬁrst to delay the entrant’s investment is very robust. There is a
single exception, which occurs when the sensitivity of the market clearing price with respect to the supplied
quantity (η) is very small or when there is an almost negligible size of the incumbent’s initial capacity. In
such a setting the entrant’s preemption trigger might fall below the one of the incumbent. The trade-oﬀ
between the initial capacity and the sensitivity parameter is depicted in Figure 6. This ﬁgure shows the two
regions where either of the ﬁrms invest ﬁrst. The curve in between depicts all values of η and q1L for which
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Figure 6: Regions where the incumbent invests ﬁrst (upper right) and where the entrant invests ﬁrst.
both ﬁrms’ preemption triggers are identical. We see that the incumbent invests ﬁrst, except for a small
region close to both axes where the entrant is the ﬁrst investor. In fact, it holds that for η · q1L > 0.01413
the incumbent is leader and the entrant invests ﬁrst for η · q1L < 0.01413. Intuition behind this result is that
for the situation where η and q1L are small the cannibalization eﬀect is small. The incentives to preempt
the entrant vanish the moment there is almost nothing to protect.
5.2 Additive demand structure
One characteristic of the multiplicative demand function, as chosen in this paper, is that the market size
is bounded. In particular, price is only positive when market quantity is lower than 1η . In order to check
that this property of the inverse demand is not crucial for our results, we carry out the same analysis as in
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Figure 7: Preemption triggers XPI (solid) and XPE (dashed) under additive demand.
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Figure 8: Investment size for diﬀerent values of q1I under additive demand.
Section 3 for an additive demand structure:
p(t) = x(t)− ηQ(t).
Details of the analysis are provided in Appendix C. Similar to the ﬁndings before, it is found that the
incumbent preempts the entrant and acquires a smaller capacity. For diﬀerent values of the initial capacity
level, Figure 7 shows the resulting preemption triggers.11 The initial capacity level under myopic investment
equals qmyop1I = 0.0487. In Appendix C also the sensitivity of the results with respect to parameter changes is
tested. It is conﬁrmed that for large sets of parameter values the incumbent always undertakes an investment
ﬁrst. Figure 8 shows the installed capacities of the incumbent, entrant and monopolist, illustrating that also
the results about underinvestment in the presence of an entry-threat, discussed above, remain valid. We
conclude that the results under additive demand are qualitatively the same as those under multiplicative
demand.
6 Welfare analysis
To conclude our analysis we examine how the behavior emerging in equilibrium compares to the outcome
chosen by a social planner interested in maximizing welfare. For the sake of comparability with the equilib-
rium analysis we restrict the number of investments of the social planner to the total number of investments
by both ﬁrms in the scenario with competition. Therefore, we consider a social planner that has the option
to invest twice in an existing market. It optimizes total welfare, being the sum of the total expected con-
sumer surplus and expected producer surplus. It is easy to see that in our setting from the perspective of
11The parameter values are chosen diﬀerently in this example, for a diﬀerent inverse demand function requires a diﬀerent
parametrization. Analogous to Boonman (2014) we set α = 0.01, r = 0.1, σ = 0.05, η = 0.5, and δ = 1.
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consumer surplus, total industry proﬁts and welfare, it is irrelevant whether these investments are made by
the same or two diﬀerent ﬁrms. The analysis is analogous to Section 3.1: ﬁrst the ﬁnal investment moment is
determined, together with the optimal investment size. Next the investment moment of the ﬁrst investment
is determined, along with the corresponding capacity size. Concerning the ﬁnal investment, the output price
after investment equals p(t) = x(t)(1− η(q0 + q1 + q2)). The total expected consumer surplus after the ﬁnal
investment then equals
CS2(X, q0, q1, q2) = E
⎡
⎢⎣
∞∫
t=0
X∫
P=p(t)
D(P ) dP e−rt dt
∣∣∣∣∣ x(0) = X
⎤
⎥⎦ = Xη(q0 + q1 + q2)2
2(r − α) ,
where D(P ) =
1
η
(
1− P
X
)
. The expected producer surplus equals the expected discounted net revenue
stream minus the investment outlay,
PS2(X, q1, q2, q3) =
X
r − α (q0 + q1 + q2)(1− η(q0 + q1 + q2))− δq2 −
X
r − α (q0 + q1)(1− η(q0 + q1)).
Expected welfare after the second investment is then obtained by adding the two together, leading to
W2(X, q0, q1, q2) =
X
r − αq2(1− η(q0 + q1 +
1
2q2))− δq2.
We ﬁnd that, for an equal level of q1 cq. q2I , the investment moment of the ﬁnal investment equals the
investment moment of the follower, but the resulting investment size is twice as large for the case of the
social planner,
XW2 =
β + 1
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− η(q0 + q1)
qW2 = 2
1− η(q0 + q1)
η(β + 1)
.
In a similar way, one can determine the optimal moment of the ﬁrst investment,
XW1 =
β
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− ηq0 − 12ηqW1
,
where the optimal investment size of the ﬁrst investment qW1 is implicitly determined by solving the following
equation for q1,
1− βηq1
2(1− η(q0 + q1)) − 2
(
β
β + 1
1− η(q0 + q1)
1− ηq0 − 12ηq1
)β
= 0.
The maximal expected welfare before any investment is given by
WW (X, q0) =
X
r − αq0(1−
1
2ηq0) +
(
X
XW1
)β
δ
β − 1q
W
1 +
(
X
XW2
)β
δ
β − 1q
W
2 .
and can be divided into two components. The ﬁrst part, consisting of one term, reﬂects the accumulated
discounted welfare stream resulting from the initial capacity level. The second part consists of two terms,
reﬂecting the value of the investment options. Let us denote the ﬁrst term as WW0 (X, q0) and the sum of
the ﬁnal two terms WWopt(X, q0). Then we can rewrite W
W (X, q0) as W
W
0 (X, q0) +W
W
opt(X, q0).
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Duopoly Social Planner
q0 XP qL XF qF Q
duop W duopopt X
W
1 q
W
1 X
W
2 q
W
2 Q
W WWopt
Wduopopt
WWopt
Qduop
QW
0 123 1.59 180 1.99 3.58 0.3058 135 2.84 212 3.40 6.24 0.3790 0.8069 0.5737
0.5 129 1.26 185 1.95 3.71 0.2258 142 2.70 224 3.23 6.43 0.3052 0.7397 0.5770
1 136 0.97 190 1.90 3.87 0.1647 150 2.55 236 3.06 6.61 0.2423 0.6798 0.5855
1.5 145 0.71 195 1.85 4.06 0.1179 159 2.41 250 2.89 6.80 0.1899 0.6208 0.5971
2 157 0.48 202 1.78 4.26 0.0815 169 2.27 266 2.72 6.99 0.1469 0.5551 0.6094
2.5 171 0.29 211 1.71 4.50 0.0565 180 2.13 283 2.55 7.18 0.1126 0.5020 0.6267
Table 3: Welfare implications of the initial capacity under duopoly and the social optimum.
Tabel 3 shows the investment triggers, the correspondig capacities and the resulting surpluses for both
the social planner and the duopoly. The table also shows the accumulated capacities Qduop and QW . The
ﬁrst observation is that the ﬁrst and second investment moment of the social planner are later than the
investment moments in the duopoly model. Moreover, the resulting capacities are larger in the case of a
welfare maximizer. So, the preemption eﬀect combined with the cannibalization eﬀect forces the incumbent
to invest too soon and acquire a small capacity. The entrant also invests sooner compared to the second
investment of the social planner and this is because the incumbent invests in a smaller capacity. The social
planner is more interested in larger quantities than proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms because ﬁrms do not internalize
the additional consumer surplus generated by a capacity increase.
Table 3 can also be used to study the eﬀect of the initial incumbent’s capacity size on the welfare. For both
the duopoly model and for the social planner model, additional welfare gained by investing drops when the
initial capacity is larger. Intuitively, the larger the old market, the lower the marginal value of an additional
unit of capital. Additionally, a larger initial capacity is equivalent to a more severe cannibalization eﬀect.
The result that additional welfare in the duopoly is more aﬀected by an increase in the initial capacity can
be explained by the presence of competition that marginalizes surplus as a result of protective behavior
towards the ﬁrms’ own proﬁt. The social planner delays investment relative to the market outcome, because
it is not aﬀected by a potential entrant’s willingness to invest soon.
The insight that under (potential) competition investment occurs too early and in too small amounts
compared to the social optimum gives rise to potential policy implications of our analysis. In particular,
policies leading to later investment by the ﬁrms, thereby inducing larger long term capacities and output
quantities would lead to a welfare improvement. Introducing a license on building capacity would, e.g.,
contribute to the desired objective. Licensing requires that upon investment the ﬁrms incur a lump-sum
cost. Since investing becomes more expensive, ﬁrms will delay their investment moment. This cost has no
direct inﬂuence on the investment amount, however, since the ﬁrms invest later, the realized investment size
will increase.
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7 Conclusions
The main message of this paper is that the interaction between timing and size of investment plays a crucial
role in the strategy of an incumbent facing the threat of entry in a dynamic market environment. Where
entry deterrence is generally understood to ward oﬀ entrants by overinvesting, we ﬁnd that entry is delayed
by accelerating the investment. This induces an investment, which is smaller than that of an incumbent
in a comparable market without an entry threat. This implication of our analysis is well suited to explain
the empirical observations reported in Leach et al. (2013). These authors show that, contrary to the
predictions of the standard entry deterrence literature, the entry threat generated by the deregulation of
the U.S. telecommunication industry did not result in an increase of capacity investments by incumbents.
As the telecommunications industry in this period clearly has the characteristics of an expanding market,
it ﬁts well with the setup of our model. Therefore, our insight that in the presence of choices about both
timing and size the incumbent’s investment should be smaller than without an entry threat, provides a clear
theoretical guidance for understanding these empirical observations. Also our result that, depending on
whether investment size is ﬂexible or ﬁxed, the incumbent respectively the entrant invests ﬁrst, is not only
a new insight in the theoretical literature, but also gives rise to potentially testable empirical implications.
The model could be extended in diﬀerent ways. In particular, it is important to examine the implications
of the existence of multiple incumbents and/or potential entrants for the main insights of our analysis.
Furthermore, the consideration of multiple investment options, although technically very challenging, is
an important further step to gain a better understanding of the evolution of industries characterized by
irreversible investments. Finally, the implications of innovating ﬁrms, either adopting new technologies or
performing R&D themselves, for capacity dynamics could be studied as an extension of the setting considered
here.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The follower’s value function with respect to the shock process x can be divided
into two regions. For x suﬃciently large the ﬁrm invests, that is for x ≥ X∗F , this region is called the
stopping region. The complementary region is called the continuation region, for these values the ﬁrm waits
(see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). In the stopping region the ﬁrm realizes the following accumulated and
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discounted expected proﬁts VF (X, q1L, q1F , q2L, q2F ) at the investment moment,
VF = E
[∫ ∞
t=0
x(t)(q1F + q2F )(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F )e−rtdt
∣∣∣ x(0) = X
]
− δq2F
= (q1F + q2F )(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F )E
[∫ ∞
t=0
x(t)e−rtdt
∣∣∣ x(0) = X]− δq2F
= (q1F + q2F )(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F )
∫ ∞
t=0
x(0)e(α−r)tdt− δq2F
=
X
r − α (q1F + q2F )(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F )− δq2F .
The ﬁrm chooses capacity such that it maximizes its proﬁts, thereto,
∂VF
∂q2F
=
X
r − α [1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L)− 2ηq2F )]− δ
= 0 ⇔
q2F (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) =
1
2η
[
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L)− δ(r − α)
X
]
.
The second order conditions reassure us that this is indeed a maximum, −2η Xr−α < 0.
In the continuation region it is optimal for the ﬁrm the delay investment, for waiting yields a larger value
than investment. The waiting value is embodied by the option value. The function FF , following standard
real options analysis (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)), equals the sum two terms reﬂecting the value of
waiting and the value of current production,
FF (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) = AFX
β +
X
r − αq1F (1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L)),
where β is the positive root following from,
σ2β2 + (2α− σ2)β = 2r ⇔ β = 12 − ασ2 +
√(
1
2 − ασ2
)2
+ 2rσ2 .
The investment trigger and the value of the parameter AF (q1L, q1F , q2L) can be found by applying the value
matching and smooth pasting conditions,
X
r − α (q1F + q2F )(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F ))− δq2F = AFX
β +
X
r − αq1F (1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L)),
1
r − α (q1F + q2F )(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F )) = AFβX
β−1 +
1
r − αq1F (1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L)).
Together they make
X
r − α (q1F +q2F )(1−η(q1L+q1F +q2L+q2F ))
(
1− 1
β
)
− X
r − αq1F (1−η(q1L+q1F +q2L))
(
1− 1
β
)
= δq2F ,
which leads to
XF =
β
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L + q2F ) .
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Plugging in q2F leads to
X∗F (q1L, q1F , q1L) =
β + 1
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L) .
Moreover,
AF (X
∗
F )
β =
X∗F
r − αq
∗
2F (1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L + q∗2F ))− δq∗2F
=
δq∗2F
β − 1 .
Rewring leads to equation
AF (q1L, q1F , q2L) =
δ2(r − α)
η(β − 1)2
(
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L)
δ(r − α)
β − 1
β + 1
)β+1
.

Proof of Proposition 2 The region with respect to X where the leader delays the follower’s investment is
bounded from below and above by Xdet1 and X
det
2 . In this region the leader optimizes capacity at investment.
The optimal amount can be found by solving the ﬁrst order condition,
∂V detL
∂q2L
=
X
r − α [1− η(2q1L + q1F + 2q2L)]−
δ
β − 1
(
X
X∗F
)β [
1− ηβ(q1L + q2L)
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L)
]
− δ. (16)
Diﬀerentiating both the left hand side and the right hand side with respect to X leads to
∂qdetL
∂X
=
1− η(2q1L + q1F + 2qdetL )− ββ+1
(
X
X∗F
)β−1
(1− 2ηq1F − (1 + β)η(q1L + qdetL ))
X
[
2− ββ+1
(
X
X∗F
)β−1 (
1− 1−η(2q1F+βq1L+βqdetL )
1−η(2q1F+q1L+qdetL )
)] > 0.
The value of Xdet2 then follows from ﬁrst inserting X
∗
F in the ﬁrst order conditions,
∂V detL
∂q2L
=
δ
β − 1
1− 2ηq1L + η(β − 1)q1F − 2ηq2L
1− η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L) = 0 ⇔ q
R
2L =
1
2η
(1− 2ηq1L + (β − 1)ηq1F ). (17)
Hence, by plugging the latter expression into X∗F one obtains X
det
2 ,
Xdet2 = X
∗
F (q1L, q1F , q
R
2L) =
β + 1
β − 1
2δ(r − α)
1− (β + 3)ηq1F
The conditions determining Xdet1 also follow from the ﬁrst order conditions by setting q2L = 0. To show
that there exists a unique point Xdet1 , it is suﬃcient to do the following. Deﬁne ψ(X) =
∂V detL
∂q2L
|q2L=0, this
function dictates the ﬁrst order conditions for the value of X yielding zero capacity,
ψ(X) =
X
r − α [1− η(2q1L + q1F )]−
δ
β − 1
(
β − 1
β + 1
1− ηq1L − 2ηq1F
δ(r − α) X
)β [
1− ηβq1L
1− ηq1L − 2ηq1F
]
− δ.
Then,
ψ(0) = −δ < 0,
ψ(X∗F ) =
δ
β − 1
1− 2ηq1L + (β − 1)ηq1F
1− ηq1L − 2ηq1F ,
ψ′(X) =
1− η(2q1L + q1F )
r − α
[
1− β
β + 1
(
X
X∗F
∣∣∣
q2L=0
)β−1]
+
β
β + 1
(
X
X∗F
∣∣∣
q2L=0
)β−1
ηq1F + (β − 1)ηq1L
r − α .
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From (17) it follows that ψ(X∗F ) > 0. Since ψ
′(X) > 0 one can conclude that, according to the Mean Value
theorem, there exists a unique Xdet1 ∈ (0, X∗F ) such that qdetL (Xdet1 , q1L, q1F ) = 0.
The value before investment is similar to the one for the follower,
F detL (X, q1L, q1F ) = A
det
L X
β +
X
r − αq1L(1− η(q1L + q1F )).
Applying the value matching and smooth pasting conditions gives (7) and
AdetL = (X
det
L )
−β δq
det
L
β − 1 −
δ
β − 1(q1L + q
det
L ) (X
∗
F )
−β
.
In order to show that for suﬃciently small q1L there exists a pair (X
det
L , q
det∗
L ) satisfying (7) and the ﬁrst
order condition for the leader, we insert (7) into (16). We treat the following two cases separately. First
we look as the scenario where the incumbent is the investment leader. Then, q1F = 0 and one obtains the
equivalent condition
β
(
1− 1− η(2q1L + 2q2L)
1− η(2q1L + q2L)
)
= 1− 1− η(β + 1)(q1L + q2L)
1− η(q1L + q2L)
(
β
β + 1
)β
. (18)
After rewriting this equation, one could similarly say that it is required that H(q2L) = 0, where,
H(q2L) = 1−η(q1L+q2L)−(1−η(β+1)(q1L+q2L))
(
β
β + 1
)β
+β
[
1− η(2q1L + 2q2L)
1− η(2q1L + q2L) − 1
]
(1−η(q1L+q2L)).
Since,
H(0) = 1− ηq1L − (1− η(β + 1)q1L)
(
β
β + 1
)β
> (1− ηq1L)
(
1−
(
β
β + 1
)β)
> 0,
H
(
1− 2ηq1L
2η
)
=
1
2
(β − 1)
((
β
β + 1
)β
− 1
)
< 0, and
∂H
∂q2L
(q2L) = −1 + (β + 1)
(
β
β + 1
)β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− βηq2L
1− η(2q1L + q2L)
[
1− η(q1L + q2L)
1− η(2q1L + q2L) − 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0,
it can be concluded that, according to the Mean Value Theorem, there exists a q2L on the interval
(
0, 1−2ηq1L2η
)
,
such that H(q2L) = 0. This value is denoted by q
det∗
L . Earlier we showed that q
det
L in an increasing function.
Then, since 12η (1− 2ηq1L) = qR2L, it follows that XdetL > Xdet1 and XdetL < Xdet2 .
In a similar way one can prove this for the scenario where the entrant is leader. Here one shows that for
q2L = 0 the function H takes a positive value, while for q2L =
1
2η < q
R
2L the function becomes negative. 
Proof of Proposition 3 The leader’s value function under the inducing immediate follower investment
strategy is determined in the same way as before. In this case, however, one needs to substitute the follower’s
capacity (3) to obtain equation (13). The leader chooses capacity such that it optimizes the value function,
∂V accL
∂q2L
=
X
2(r − α) [1− 2η(q1L + q2L)]−
1
2
δ ⇔ qaccL (X, q1L, q1F ) =
1
2η
[
1− 2ηq1L − δ(r − α)
X
]
.
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It is easily checked that qaccL ≥ 0 if and only if 1− 2ηq1L ≥ δ(r−α)X , i.e. if
X ≥ δ(r − α)
1− 2ηq1L .
The second order conditions again make sure that we obtain a maximum, −2η Xr−α < 0. Solving qaccL = qˆ2L
leads to the ﬁrst term in equation (11), i.e.,
qaccL =
1
2η
[
1− 2ηq1L − δ(r − α)
X
]
=
1
η
[
1− 2ηq1F − ηq1L − δ(β + 1)(r − α)
(β − 1)X
]
= qˆ2L
⇔
1− 4ηq1F = δ(r − α)(β + 3)
(β − 1)X ⇔ X
acc
0 =
β + 3
β − 1
δ(r − α)
1− 4ηq1F .
Assuming again a value function of the form
F accL (X, q1L, q1F ) = A
acc
L X
β +
X
r − αq1L(1− η(q1L + q1F ))
one can apply the value matching and smooth pasting conditions. Using q1L · q1F = 0, to simplify the term
for XaccL (q1L, q1F , q2L) resulting from these two conditions one ends up with (12). Moreover,
AaccL · (XaccL )β =
XdetL
r − α [(q1L + q
acc
L )(1− η(q1L + q1F + qaccL + q∗2F ))− q1L(1− η(q1L + q1F ))]− δqaccL
=
δβ
β − 1q
acc
L − δqaccL =
δqaccL
β − 1 .
To show existence of (qacc∗L , X
acc
L ) for suﬃciently small q1L we insert q1L = 0 and (12) into the equation
qacc∗L = q
acc
L (X
acc
L , q1L). Solving for q2L gives (q
acc∗
L =
1
3β−1 > 0. Therefore, by continuity, we have
XaccL >
δ(r−α)
1−2ηq1L for suﬃciently small q1L. 
Proof of Proposition 4 We observe that
Xacc1
Xdet2
=
β + 3
2β + 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
1− (3 + β)ηq1F
1− 4ηq1F︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
< 1,
and therefore Xacc1 < X
det
2 . Furthermore, for X = X
acc
1 we have by deﬁnition q
acc
L = qˆ2L (ignoring the trivial
case where qaccL = 0) and, due to X
acc
1 < X
det
2 , q
det
L > qˆ2L . Since q
det
L is the maximizer of V
det
L , this yields
V detL (X
acc
1 , q1L, q1F , q
det
L ) > V
det
L (X
acc
1 , q1L, q1F , q
acc
L ) = V
acc
L (X
acc
1 , q1L, q1F , q
acc
L ),
where the last equality follows from the observation that at q2L = q
acc
L = qˆ2L the value functions both
investment strategies coincide. Similarly, we obtain for X = Xdet2
V accL (X
det
1 , q1L, q1F , q
acc
L ) > V
acc
L (X
det
1 , q1L, q1F , q
det
L ) = V
det
L (X
det
1 , q1L, q1F , q
det
L ),
because qdetL = qˆ2L. Since the delaying follower investment strategy is feasible for X ∈ [Xdet1 , Xdet2 ] and
the inducing immediate follower investment strategy for X ∈ [Xacc1 ,∞) we conclude that for X ≤ Xacc1
the leader optimally delays the follower’s investment and for X ≥ Xdet2 the follower is enforced to invest
immediately. 
31
Proof of Proposition 5 Existence of the preemption equilibrium follows from the arguments given in
the text. In order to show that no other subgame-perfect equilibria exist, we ﬁrst note that in this type
of games, apart from preemption equilibria, potentially also sequential investment, simultaneous investment
and joint investment might arise as equilibrium behavior. Here we follow the terminology as in Pawlina
and Kort (2006). Sequential equilibria would imply that one ﬁrm is investing strictly before the preemption
point of the competitor, which has already been ruled out for this setting. The remaining two types of
equilibria involve tacit collusion among the ﬁrms. When ﬁrms decide to collude, they wait for the market to
expand, that is, wait for a larger value of X, before investment is undertaken together at the same time. One
can discriminate two types of collusion, distinguished by the order in which ﬁrms determine their capacity
size. In the ﬁrst type, one ﬁrm is Stackelberg capacity leader and decides upon the amount ﬁrst where
subsequently the second ﬁrm makes an immediate investment. The second investor sets its capacity after
the ﬁrst ﬁrm decided upon its investment scale. This type is called simultaneous investment. The second
type, referred to as joint investment, is the category where there is no colluded investment order. Firms
simultaneously decide upon capacities, leading to a Cournot type of equilibrium. The following Lemmas 2
and 3 rule out the existence of simultaneous investment and joint investment equilibria.
Lemma 1 Assume that q1I = q
myop
1I . Then for the incumbent the leader’s investment threshold X
det
L (q
myop
1I , 0)
does not exist. Hence, it is optimal for the incumbent to delay investment as much as possible and to invest
just before the entrant’s preemption point XPE.
Proof of Lemma 1 We rewrite equation (9) as
F detL (X, q1L, q1F ) =
X
r − αq1L(1− η(q1L + q1F )) +A
det
L X
β .
Then AdetL reﬂects the net gain from investment. Let X
det
L and X
∗
F be deﬁned as in equations (7) and (4).
Let q1L = q1I = q
myop
1I =
1
η(β+1) and q1F = 0. Then,
XdetL
X∗F
=
β − 1 + 1β+1 − βηqdet2I
β − 1− (β + 1)ηqdet2I
> 1.
Furthermore,
AdetL = (X
det
L )
−β δq
det
2I
β − 1 −
δ
β − 1(q
myop
1I + q
det
2I )(X
∗
F )
−β
=
δ
β − 1
[
qdet2I
[(
1
XdetL
)β
−
(
1
X∗F
)β]
− qmyop1I
(
1
X∗F
)β]
< 0.
This means that investment decreases the incumbent’s payoﬀ and the incumbent would never choose this
strategy as a leader, if investment roles were exogenously determined. Hence, XdetL does not exist and under
endogenous investment roles it is optimal for the incumbent to delay investment as long as possible without
jeopardizing the role as leader. 
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Lemma 2 Simultaneous investment does not yield an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2 For the resulting value functions, the curves in Figure 2a should be considered. Here,
the Stackelberg leader utilizes the inducing immediate follower investment strategy, denoted by acc. As a
result, the competitor receives the follower value, being smaller than the leader value. For this reason neither
of the ﬁrms would prefer to be a follower in the outcome and they would, consequently, preempt each other
in taking the leader role. This forces the ﬁrms to end up in the region where the leader delays the follower’s
investment and the sole resulting equilbrium is the preemptive equilibrium where the follower prefers to wait
rather than invest at the same time. Hence, simultaneous investment is not an equilibrium. 
Lemma 3 Joint investment does not yield and equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3 Let J(X, q1L, q1F , q2L, q2F ) be the ﬁrm value for joint investment, then,
J =
X
r − α (q1L + q2L)(1− η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F ))− δq2L.
Optimal capacities equal,
qjoin2L =
1
3η
(
1− δ(r − α)
X
)
− q1L,
qjoin2F =
1
3η
(
1− δ(r − α)
X
)
− q1F .
This leads to,
V accL (X, q1L, q1F , q
acc
L , q
∗
2F ) =
X
r − α
1
8η
(
1− δ(r − α)
X
)2
+ δq1L
J(X, q1L, q1F , q
join
2L , q
join
2F ) =
X
r − α
1
9η
(
1− δ(r − α)
X
)2
+ δq1L
Hence, it holds that V accL > J . This is suﬃcient to show that joint investment does not yield an equilibrium.
Intuition behind this result is that when ﬁrms are leader they can set a larger capacity which leads to a
higher payoﬀ. 
This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
Appendix B: Robustness
Robustness of the preemption equilibrium
In Figures 9 and Figure 10 we show the diﬀerences in preemption points (XPE − XPI) for variations of
all model parameters in a relevant range. This is done for both q1I = q
myop
1I and q1I = 0.5. Similarly, the
diﬀerence between the leaders investment trigger under the delaying follower investment strategy under the
entrants preemption point (XdetL −XPE) is shown for the same parameter variations and q1I = 0.5 in Figure
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11. For q1I = q
myop
1I the investment trigger X
det
L does not exist and hence the incumbent does not have an
incentive to invest before the entrants preemtpion point is reached (see Lemma 1 in Appendix A). These
ﬁgures conﬁrm the claim that, apart from the hardly relevant case where η is extremely small (discussed in
Section 5.1), under all parameter variations the preemption equilibrium with the incumbent as leader exists.
Sensitivity analysis
The aim of this section is to brieﬂy study the eﬀect of the model parameters on the equilibrium. In this
model there are six parameters to be taken a closer look at. First of all, the sensitivity parameter η capturing
the negative relation between prices and output. The second parameter is the ﬁxed discount rate r. Then,
the drift parameter α and the volatility parameter σ reﬂecting the market’s uncertainty, both present in
the geometric Brownian motion describing the state variable’s path. Subsequently, we have the marginal
investment cost δ.
η r α δ σ
XPE (q1I = q
myop
1I ) 0 + -/+ + +
qdet2I (q1I = q
myop
1I ) - +/- +/- 0 +/-
XPE (q1I ﬁxed) + + - + +
qdet2I (q1I ﬁxed) - - + 0 +
Table 4: Eﬀect of an increase in parameter values on triggers and capacities
When η increases the output q2I decreases exactly canceling out the increase in η, i.e. the product η · q2I
remains constant. Similarly η · qmyop1I and η · qE remain constant. In this way, when assuming q1I = qmyop1I ,
neither the investment threshold XdetL , nor the preemption trigger are aﬀected by an increase in η. However,
when one assumes q1I to be ﬁxed, triggers are aﬀected. An increase in η means an increase in ηq1I and
resultingly a decrease in the price, which, hence, makes ﬁrms delay investment. Nevertheless, the total eﬀect
on the investment size is negative, considering the diﬀerent eﬀects. When discounting is done under a higher
rate, one values future revenues relatively less and one becomes more concerned about current proﬁts. If the
interest rate increases, one prefers current proﬁts to be higher and therefore delays investment. In the ﬁrst
place, this increases the myopic capacity size on the initial market. In the second place, since there are two
eﬀects that inﬂuence the optimal investment size for the expansion - i.e. delaying increases the capacity level,
but a larger old market decreases it - it is found that the change is ambiguous. For small r the installment
increases, but for relatively large r it decreases. When one ﬁxes the initial capacity, the eﬀect of the old
market dominantly inﬂuences the capacity leading to decreasing installments. As standard in literature, the
drift parameter has an opposite eﬀect: a larger α makes ﬁrms invest earlier. The main line of reasoning is the
same, when the drift parameter increases. Market demand, and therefore proﬁts, are expected to increase
more rapidly; one is then prepared to invest earlier to meet the same expectations concerning expected
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Figure 9: Diﬀerence between preemption points with q1I = q
myop
1I .
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Figure 10: Diﬀerence between preemption points with q1I = 0.5.
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Figure 11: Diﬀerence between the incumbent’s investment triggers and the entrant’s preemption point for
q1I = 0.5.
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revenues. Nevertheless, when the initial capacity also changes under a change in parameter values,12 a
second eﬀect comes in, similar to the analysis of η: a larger drift increases the initial capacity which leads
to a delay of the investment. The eﬀect on the optimal capacity is similar to the eﬀect of r when the initial
capacity is determined endogenously as qmyop1I , but is, as expected, opposite to r when ﬁxing it. The marginal
investment cost has a positive eﬀect on the investment trigger. When investing becomes more expensive,
ﬁrms prefer to wait for a market where a larger output is required in order to meet the larger costs. The
optimal capacities, both when ﬁxing the initial market size and taking it myopically, are not aﬀected. Finally,
in a more uncertain market, i.e. a larger σ, future realizations become more important. Waiting gives more
information. This leads to the decision to wait for a higher price, in other words, the ﬁrm is only prepared
to invest for a larger value of x. This leads to an increase in the optimal capacity size. However, as in the
case of r and α, the eﬀect is ambiguous when assuming a myopic initial market size.
Appendix C: Model Extensions
Fixed capacity
Suppose X = XPE , then one can show that
V detLE − F detFE =
[
X
r − αK(1− ηK − ηq1I)− δK
]⎡⎣1− (X
∗
FE)
1−β
r−α K(ηq1I + ηK) +
δK
β−1 (
1
X∗FI
)β
(X∗FI)
1−β
r−α ηK
2 + δKβ−1 (
1
X∗FE
)β
⎤
⎦ .
One can conclude, if
f1(q1I ,K) = (1− ηq1I − 2ηK)β−1(1− ηq1I(β + 1)− ηK(β + 2))
>
f2(q1I ,K) = (1− 2ηq1I − 2ηK)β−1(1− 2ηq1I − ηK(β + 2)),
then V detLI (XPE) > FFI(XPE) and as a result XPI < XPE .
Additive demand
Here, we ﬁrst shortly summarize all the obtained propositions. Then, we will show some graphs to check
the robustness of the results.
Proposition 6 Let the current value of the stochastic demand process be denoted by X, and let the initial
production capacity be denoted by q1L and q1F respectively for the leader and the follower. Let the capacities
associated with the investments be denoted by q2L and q2F respectively for the leader and the follower. Then
the value function of the follower can be partitioned into two regions: for small X the ﬁrm waits until it
12Note that, since the initial capacity equals the myopic investment level, i.e. q1I =
1
η(β+1)
, its level depends on the other
parameter values.
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reaches the investment trigger X∗F and for X ≥ X∗F the ﬁrm invests immediately. As a result, the follower’s
value function V ∗F (X, q1L, q1F , q2L, q2F ) is given by
V ∗F =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
AFX
β + q1F
(
X
r−α − ηr (q1L + q1F + q2L)
)
if X < X∗F ,
(q1F + q2F )
(
X
r−α − ηr (q1L + q1F + q2L + q2F )
)
− δq2F if X ≥ X∗F ,
where the optimal capacity level for the follower q∗2F , the investment trigger X
∗
F and AF are deﬁned by
q∗2F (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) =
r
2η
(
X
r − α − δ
)
− 12 (q1L + 2q1F + q2L), (19)
X∗F (q1L, q1F , q2L) = (η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L) + δr)
β(r − α)
r(β − 2) , (20)
AF =
η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L) + δr
η(β − 2)β(r − α) (X
∗
F )
1−β . (21)
The follower’s capacity in case the follower invests at the investment trigger equals
q∗2F (X
∗
F , q1L, q1F , q2L) =
η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L) + δr
η(β − 2) .
Proposition 7 Let the production capacities be deﬁned as in Proposition 6 and let the current value of
the shock process be deﬁned as X. Then the delaying follower investment strategy leads to value function
V detL (X, q1L, q1F , q2L),
V detL = (q1L + q2L)
(
X
r − α −
η(q1L + q1F + q2L)
r
)
− (q1L + q2L)η(q1L + 2q1F + q2L) + δr
r(β − 2)
(
X
X∗F
)β
− δq2L,
where X∗F is deﬁned as equation (20).
For large initial values of X the leader invests immediately and chooses optimal capacity
qdetL (X, q1L, q1F ) = argmax{V detL (X, q1L, q1F , q2L) | q2L > qˆ2L}, (22)
where,
qˆ2L(X, q1L, q1F ) =
r
η
[
X(β − 2)
β(r − α) −
δ
r
]
− (q1L + 2q1F ).
Delaying the follower’s investment is considered for X ∈ (Xdet1 , Xdet2 ), where
Xdet1 = {X | qdet2 (X, q1L, q1F ) = 0},
Xdet2 = {X | qdet2 (X, q1L, q1F ) = qˆ2L(X, q1L, q1F )}.
For low initial values of x, that is x(0) < XdetL , the leader invests at the moment x reaches the invest-
ment threshold value XdetL . The value of the investment threshold and the associated capacity level q
det
L are
determined as the solution of the set of equations determined by equation (22) and
XdetL (q1L, q1F , q2L) =
[η
r
(2q1L + q1F + q
∗
2L) + δ
] β(r − α)
β − 1 .
The value function before investment is deﬁned as
F detL (X, q1L, q1F , q
det
L ) = q1L
(
X
r − α −
η(q1L + q1F )
r
)
+
(
X
XdetL
)β δqdetL
β − 1 − (q1L + q
det
L )
(
X
X∗F
)β δ
β − 1 .
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Proposition 8 Let the production capacities be deﬁned as in Proposition 6 and let the current value of the
shock process be deﬁned as X. Then the inducing immediate follower investment strategy is considered for
X ∈ (Xacc1 ,∞), where,
Xacc1 = max
{
β(r − α)
r(β − 4) (4ηq1F + δ), δ(r − α)
}
.
Inducing immediate follower investment leads to value function V accL (X, q1L, q1F , q2L),
V accL = (q1L + q2L)
(
X
r − α −
η(q1L + q1F + q2L + q
∗
2F )
r
)
− δq2L,
= (q1L + q2L)
1
2
(
X
r − α −
η(q1L + q2L)
r
)
− 12δ(q2L − q1L).
For large initial values of X the leader invests immediately and chooses optimal capacity
qaccL (X, q1L) =
r
2η
(
X
r − α − δ
)
− q1L. (23)
For low values of x(0) = X, that is X < XaccL , the leader will invest when x reaches investment threshold
value XaccL . The value of the investment threshold and the associated capacity level q
acc
L are determined as
the solution of the set of equations determined by equation (23) and
XaccL (q1L, q1F , q2L) =
ηq2L(q2L + 2q1L) + δrq2L
q2L − q1L
2β(r − α)
r(β − 1) .
The value function before investment is deﬁned as
F accL (X, q1L, q1F ) = q1L
(
X
r − α −
η(q1L + q1F )
r
)
+
(
X
XaccL
)β δqaccL
β − 1 .
The following ﬁgures show how the preemption points change under a change in parameter values for the
model with additive demand.
40
0.004 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.016
Α
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
XPE  XPI
(a) Diﬀerence between preemption points with q1I = q
myop
1I .
0.004 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.016
Α
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
XPE  XPI
(b) Diﬀerence between preemption points with q1I = 0.01.
Figure 12: Diﬀerence between preemption points for diﬀerent values of α.
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Figure 13: Diﬀerence between preemption points for diﬀerent values of σ.
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Figure 14: Diﬀerence between preemption points for diﬀerent values of δ.
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Figure 15: Diﬀerence between preemption points for diﬀerent values of r.
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Figure 16: Diﬀerence between preemption points for diﬀerent values of η.
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